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Abstract
This note points out some restrictions imposed by the notion of ratiﬁcation. This notion
is widely used in the mechanism design literature that assumes that each agent has a veto
power. We exhibit allocations that are not ratiﬁable and nevertheless can be implemented
through a mechanism that gives veto power to the agents.
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11 Introduction
This paper investigates the issue of voluntary participation to a contractual relationship
and the impact of agents’ veto power on contractual outcomes. We consider situations
in which a mechanism designer (or mediator) oﬀers a contract to a set of agents that all
have veto power, i.e. situations in which the contract must be accepted by every agent to
become binding. Such situations arise in a wide range of applied mechanism design mod-
els including models of pretrial negotiations (see Nalebuﬀ, 1987), cartel agreements (see
Cramton and Palfrey, 1990) or collusion in auctions (see Caillaud and Jehiel, 1998). More
recently, a fastly growing literature on collusion in organizations (Laﬀont-Martimort, 1997
and 2000, Mookherjee and Tsumagari, 2004, Che and Kim, 2006, Jeon and Menicucci,
2006, Pavlov, 2006) also uses models of veto constrained mechanism design. In all those
papers, a mediator oﬀers to the agents a mechanism (the negotiated settlement, the cartel
agreement or the collusive side-contract) that must be accepted by every one to become
binding. A key issue is therefore the determination of the outside options. Indeed, in
those models, reservation utility is not exogenously ﬁxed but comes from the outcome of
non-cooperative behavior in the strategic underlying game (the trial game, the product
competition game, the auction or the grand-mechanism that governs the organization).
On a theoretical ground, a general treatment of veto power in mechanism design has
been oﬀered by Cramton and Palfrey (1995) who introduced the notion of ratiﬁability.
Starting from a one-stage game in strategic form, they model the mechanism design
problem as a three stage game. First, the mediator proposes a mechanism. Then each
agent can accept or refuse this mechanism ; this is the ratiﬁcation stage. Finally agents
either play the mechanism if it was ratiﬁed, or play non-cooperatively the underlying
game with updated beliefs if it was vetoed. 1
All papers in the veto constrained mechanism design literature use this ratiﬁcation
approach and solve the models by computing the optimal ratiﬁable mechanism, that
is to say the optimal mechanism that is accepted by every agent in the second stage.
In particular in the collusion in organizations literature, the collusive side-contract is
constrained to be ratiﬁable and by induction, the optimal design of the overall organization
is constrained to be robust to ratiﬁable side-contracts.
In this paper, we argue that the ratiﬁcation approach might not be as general as
1In the original ratiﬁability notion, there is a restriction on out-of-equilibrium beliefs. They are
supposed to satisfy the perfect sequential equilibrium reﬁnement. In this paper, we abstract from the
belief reﬁnement issue and concentrate on the sequence of events, in particular on the existence of a
distinct ratiﬁcation stage.
1desired for the above mentionned applications and that imposing ratiﬁability is distinct
from imposing veto constraints. We show that, starting from a one-stage game in strategic
form, there exist some allocations that can be achieved via a mechanism that guarantees
veto power but that cannot be achieved if we impose ratiﬁability. Therefore, the optimal
veto constrained allocation may not be ratiﬁable. Our construction mixes the two roles
of a mediator that were pushed forward in the literature (see Myerson, 1994): proposing
binding contracts and proposing mediated communication protocols.
The possible loss of generality comes from the assumption that there is a distinct
ratiﬁcation stage in the ratiﬁable mechanism design timing. If we drop that assumption
and assume that acceptance/refusal and type revealing messages are sent simultaneously
by the agents, it is possible to enlarge the set of implementable allocations.
The note is organized as follows. In section 2 we detail the ratiﬁability and the veto
constrained implementability notions. Then, we prove in section 3 that the set of veto
constrained implementable outcomes is larger than the set of ratiﬁable outcomes and
strictly larger for a non-empty set of underlying games. Section 4 concludes.
2 Veto constrained mechanism design
The starting point of the analysis is a strategic situation modelled by a one-stage N-
player (or agent) game in strategic form G. As is usual in quasi-linear mechanism design
problems, G can be a game of imperfect information and we assume that utility is trans-
ferable among agents. In the sequel, G is characterized by an information structure
{(Θi)i∈N,(pi)i∈N}, and a payoﬀ function for agent i, Ui(θ,s). With these notations Θi
is the set of possible types for agent i, pi(θ−i | θi) is the probability that a θi-agent i
assignes to the state of nature θ = (θi,θ−i) and s = (s1,...,sn) is the vector of strategies
followed by the agents. The functions pi therefore characterize the beliefs of the agents.
This game describes the environment of the agents if there were no contractual opppor-
tunities. Introducing such opportunities transforms the initial game G into a multistage
game. In the ﬁrst stage, a mediator proposes a mechanism M to the agents which can
specify the strategies si to be followed in the game G as well as monetary transfers ti
made to the agent as functions of the messages mi received by the mediator. This mech-
anism induces a game which is subsequently played by the agents. The basic question is
then, starting from game G, what ﬁnal allocation can be reached through a contractual
agreement. Throughout the analysis, we assume that agents have the ability to veto the
proposed mechanism. Therefore, we impose in the following that, if at least one of the
2agents refuses to participate in the mechanism M, they cannot use a binding agreement
to play G.
A possible formulation of our problem which takes into account the veto power of the
agents is given below. Starting from G, consider the enriched game G which is described
by the following timing:
• t = 1 The mediator proposes a mechanism M,
• t = 2 Agents simultaneously accept or refuse M. If at least one agent refuses M,
then go to t = 30; otherwise go to t = 3.
• t = 3 Agents learn that M has been accepted by all. They send messages m to the
mediator who implements {s(m),t(m)} in G. The game ends.
• t = 30 Agents learn that M has been vetoed by at least one agent. Each agent
updates its beliefs about the other agents’ types and play non-cooperatively the game G
with updated beliefs and mediated communication. The game ends.
The formulation detailed above takes into account the commitment power of the me-
diator and assumes that the communication protocol used at date t = 30 is included in
the mechanism M announced at date t = 1.
Deﬁnition 1 Ratiﬁability A ﬁnal allocation is ratiﬁable if and only if there exists a
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of G that implements it.
A justiﬁcation for the term ratiﬁability stems from the fact that it can be shown that a
ratiﬁable allocation can be implemented by a mechanism M that is accepted by every
agent (see the proof of Proposition 1). Actually, Cramton and Palfrey (1995) use the
term ratiﬁability to characterize mechanisms M and not allocations. The two uses are
equivalent.
Veto power is taken into account by assuming, at date t = 2, a ratiﬁcation stage in
the formulation of the mechanism design sequence of events. To the best of our knowl-
edge, such a ratiﬁcation stage is a common feature of all papers in the mechanism design
literature that assume veto power. However, this concept of ratiﬁability is a slight gener-
alization of that introduced by Cramton and Palfrey (1995) who do not explicitly consider
the possibility of mediated communication. At date t = 30 they assumed that agents play
a non-cooperative equilibrium of G played with updated beliefs whereas we asssume that
they play a communication equilibrium of G played with updated beliefs, i.e. we assume
that even if M is not ratiﬁed, the mediator can still be used to coordinate the strategies
3in G (therefore we follow Myerson (1994) and consider two possible roles for a mediator:
oﬀering binding contracts and oﬀering mediated communication protocols).
In addition, they introduce some reﬁnement, based on perfect sequential equilibrium,
on out-of-equilibrium beliefs. We voluntarily abstract from belief reﬁnement issues and
concentrate on the sequence of moves to simplify the exposition of the argument which
could be adapted if we impose some restriction on out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Of course,
considering a stricter concept for ratiﬁability would only reinforce the results of Proposi-
tions 1 and 2.
Alternatively, consider the enriched game G0 which is described by the following timing:
• t = 1 The mediator proposes a mechanism M,
• t = 2 Agents simultaneously accept or refuse M and send messages m to the medi-
ator. If at least one agent refuses M, then go to t = 30; otherwise go to t = 3.
• t = 3 The mediator implements {s(m),t(m)} in G. The game ends.
• t = 30 Agents learn that M has been vetoed. Each agent updates its beliefs about
the other agents’ types and play non-cooperatively the game G with updated beliefs and
mediated communication. The game ends.
The diﬀerence between G and G0 concerns the date at which messages are sent to
the mediator. This is important to determine what occurs in case we reach date t = 30
because the information possessed by the mediator is not the same in the two games.
Deﬁnition 2 Veto constrained implementability A ﬁnal allocation is veto constrained
implementable if and only if there exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of G0 that imple-
ments it.
3 Ratiﬁability is a restrictive notion
Moving from G to G0, the mediator is endowed with more design abilities because he is
not restricted to receive only acceptance/refusal messages at date t = 2. Therefore, and
as intuition suggests, we start by showing that the veto constrained implementability
concept is, at least weakly, less restrictive than the ratiﬁability concept.
Proposition 1 For any game G, the set of ratiﬁable allocations is included in the set of
veto constrained implementable allocations.
4Proof: Consider any ratiﬁable allocation and the corresponding mechanism M that is
oﬀered by the mediator. According to M = {(a,r)i,(m)i,s(m),t(m),(m0)i,s0(m0)}, agents
can accept (a) or refuse (r) the mechanism at date t = 2. If they all accepted it, they are
required to send a message mi to the mediator who then implements (s(m),t(m)) in G. If
M is vetoed by at least one agent, agents send messages m0
i to the mediator who then sends
back the message s0
i(m0) to agent i. Such a message s0
i is basically a recommended strategy
and s0(m0) is designed to be directly truthful revealing and obedient (this is a direct
consequence of the revelation principle for Bayesian games). For the agents, a (possibly
mixed) strategy in G is described by Σi(θi) = {(a,r),pi(a),mi(a),pi(v),m0
i(v),si(s0,v)}
where (a,r) is the decision to accept or refuse M. The function pi(a) describes the updated
beliefs of the agent if M is accepted by everybody while pi(v) describes the beliefs if M
has been vetoed. Then mi(a) is the message sent to the mediator at date t = 3 and m0
i(v),
si(s0,v) describe the strategy in the communication game at date t = 30. In equilibrium,
the strategies Σi are mutual best-responses and beliefs pi are updated using Bayes rule
whenever it is possible. In such an equilibrium, the payoﬀ of a θi-agent i is
Πi(θi) = Eθ−i|θiEΣi(θi)×Σ−i(θ−i)[Ui(θ,si,s−i) + ti(mi,m−i)],
where E· denotes the expectation operator. Because Σi(θi) is an equilibrium strategy, a
θi-agent i is better oﬀ by playing Σi(θi) rather than Σi(˜ θi):
Πi(θi) ≥ Eθ−i|θiEΣi(˜ θi)×Σ−i(θ−i)[Ui(θ,si,s−i) + ti(mi,m−i)],
and is also (at least weakly) better oﬀ than if he decides to veto M with probability 1.
We sart by showing that M is equivalent to a mechanism M∗ that is accepted every-
where on the equilibrium path.
The mediator can always replicate via an accepted mechanism what is achieved via a
communication game that follows a vetoed mechanism. Therefore it is possible to build an










Such a mechanism M∗ replicates the ratiﬁable allocation if it is accepted by all players.
Following a veto, M∗ speciﬁes an incentive compatible and obedient direct revealing
communication protocol, that exactly replicates what followed a veto in M:






i is possibly a mixed strategy. Acceptance M∗ is therefore sustained by the out-
of-equilibrium beliefs (pi(v)) deﬁned in the equilibrium strategies of M.
Consider now the game G0 and the mechanism M0 = {(θi,r)i,s∗(θ),t∗(θ),(θi)i,s0(θ)}
that replicates M∗ except that now, the message previously sent at date t = 3 is sent at
date t = 2, simultaneously with the acceptance or refusal decision. On the equilibrium
path agents take their decisions with exactly the same beliefs because Bayes rule impose
that they do not change their beliefs after observing acceptance of the mechanism in
M∗. Therefore M0 is incentive compatible because M∗ is. Out-of-equilibrium, i.e. after a
veto, pi(v) can describe the agents’ beliefs and the communication system {(θi)i,s0(θ)} is
incentive compatible and obedient. Therefore, M0 implements in G0 the initial ratiﬁable
allocation and this shows that the set of ratiﬁable allocations is included in the set of veto
constrained implementable allocations. 
We then show that in some situations it is strictly less restrictive.
Proposition 2 For some games G, there exist allocations that are veto constrained im-
plementable but are not ratiﬁable.
Proof: To show that for some games G, the inclusion is strict, let us consider the






















Figure 1: Game G1
In this game, agent 1 plays rows, agent 2 plays columns and the state of nature (θ
or ¯ θ) is agent 1’s private information. We assume that θ is distributed according to
6p =Prob(θ = θ) and 0 < p < 1/2. We concentrate on allocations that maximize agent
1’s payoﬀ. Suppose that, in game G1, agent 2 vetoes the contract during the ratiﬁcation
stage. Then the two agents must play a communication equilibrium of G1 played with
passive beliefs (the beliefs agent 2 has on agent 1 cannot have changed because agent 1
played his equilibrium pooling strategy a, and agent 2 has no private information thus
agent 1 cannot learn anything by observing a refusal by agent 2). Strategy u is dominant
for a ¯ θ-agent 1 and the mediator cannot recommend another strategy for this type of
agent 1 (otherwise agent 1 would not be obedient). Similarly, it can recommend to play
strategy d to a θ-agent 1 only if agent 2 then plays r with probability 1 (this is implied
by the obedience constraint) and must also play r in case the message sent by agent 1 is
¯ θ otherwise a θ-agent 1 would have an incentive to lie (thus this second point is implied
by the truthtelling constraints). But then, c strictly dominates r for player 2. We deduce
from this reasoning that agent 1 can only be recommended to play u in all states. Then ,
because p < 1/2, agent 2 can guarantee himself a payoﬀ equal to 3−2p > 2 by playing c.
We conclude that, if there is a ratiﬁcation stage, the best expected payoﬀ that agent 1 can
obtain by contracting with agent 2 to play G1 is 3 + 2p (the mechanism will implement
(u;l) or (u;c) depending on the state of nature and a transfer equal to 2p in expectation).
Now, consider what can be achieved in G0
1. The acceptance/refusal decision of each
agent is incorporated in the messages simultaneously sent to the mediator at date t = 2.
The diﬀerence is that now, when agent 1 learns the refusal decision of agent 2, he already
sent his information to the mediator : the out-of-equilibrium mechanism will not need to
be truthful revealing and obedient, but only obedient. This will relax some important
constraints in the case of G1. Consider the following mechanism: agent 1 is asked to send
an acceptance/refusal message together with his type information to the mediator and
simultaneously, agent 2 is asked to send an acceptance/refusal decision to the mediator.
In case both accept and agent 1 claims θ, the mediator implements (u;l) and a transfer
equal to 3 from agent 2 to agent 1; if both accept and agent 1 claims ¯ θ, the mediator
implements (u;c) and no transfer. If agent 2 refuses and agent 1 claims θ, the mediator
recommends (d;r) while he recommends (u;c) in case agent 1 claims ¯ θ. This contract is
accepted and truthfully played on the equilibrium path and brings a payoﬀ equal to 3+3p
to agent 1. Such an allocation is not ratiﬁable. 
74 Conclusion
Building mechanism design models that give a veto power to each agent seems to be
desirable for many applications ranging from pretrial settlement analysis to collusion study
in auctions or in organizations. The standard and common approach used in the literature
consists in introducing a distinct ratiﬁcation stage in the mechanism design protocol to
take into account the veto option. We showed that such an approach might involve
some unsuspected loss of generality. There exist some veto constrained implementable
allocations that are not ratiﬁable. In the paper we abstracted from belief reﬁnement
issues but they could be imposed on the veto constrained implementability notion as well
as on the ratiﬁability notion without changing much of the argument.
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